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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF PEACEBUILDING 
AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
IN A FUTURE AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY:
TIME FOR AN “OFF SHORE” APPROACH?
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
As the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan wind down, it is the right time to 
examine the role of peacebuilding and conflict man-
agement in a future American grand strategy. With 
the enormous cost in blood and money these efforts 
have tallied, it seems clear that nations, to include es-
pecially the United States, need to consider alterna-
tive approaches to accomplish their strategic goals. 
As unpopular as the recent conflicts have become in 
the American body politic, it seems inevitable that 
circumstances arise where peacebuilding and conflict 
management operations are needed.
Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Armed 
Forces to develop methodologies to accomplish these 
missions, and to do so in a way that is supportable by 
the public. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
what that approach might be and how it might ad-
dress the existing deficiencies in peacebuilding and 
conflict management techniques, and to do so in the 
context of an American grand strategy. It will propose 
an “off shore” approach, one that leverages American 
asymmetric capabilities, while realistically assessing 
the difficulties occasioned by manpower-intensive 
approaches that are extant. The chapter begins with 
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a discussion of the threshold questions, the ones that 
will provide the necessary context for the proposal: 
What is grand strategy? Does America have one? 
WHAT IS GRAND STRATEGY?
Answering this question presents a daunting chal-
lenge, as there are so many respected authorities who 
believe that America does not have a grand strategy 
now, and has little prospect of formulating one  that is 
suitable for planning purposes in the near future.1 Yet 
definitions for grand strategy exist. For example, the 
American Grand Strategy Program at Duke Univer-
sity defines grand strategy as a “quintessentially inter-
disciplinary concept, approach, and field of study.”2 It 
goes on to say that:
•  Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends 
and means. It involves purposive action—what 
leaders think and want.
•  It operates in peacetime and wartime, incor-
porating military and nonmilitary tools and 
aggregating subsidiary tactics, operations, and 
policies.
•  Grand strategy begins with theory: leaders’ 
ideas about how the world is, or ought to be, 
and their states’ roles in that world. Yet it is 
embodied in policy and practice: government 
action and reaction in response to real (or per-
ceived) threats and opportunities.
•  It lends itself to vigorous interpretive academic 
debates, yet it is so realistic that practitioners 
can and must contribute for it to be properly 
understood.3
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With that understood, the Duke program defines 
American grand strategy as: 
the collection of plans and policies by which the lead-
ership of the United States mobilizes and deploys the 
country’s resources and capabilities, both military and 
nonmilitary, to achieve its national goals.4
One might say, then, that American grand strategy 
simply seeks to create an environment where Ameri-
can values can flourish, to include especially the free 
enterprise system as well as a liberal democratic pol-
ity. This is not intended to be yet another expression 
of American exceptionalism, but rather a manifesta-
tion of the idea that these two principles offer the best 
hope of realistically harnessing human nature for not 
just American interests, but for the global common 
good writ large.
This is not to advocate unbridled free enterprise. 
Free enterprise that is exploitive of individuals, espe-
cially those in a society who—for any number of rea-
sons—feel themselves dispossessed or unable to ac-
cess the means of upward mobility, can be the source 
of societal discontent and disorder. Additionally, free 
enterprise that is indifferent to the environment in a 
world increasingly aware of the global consequences 
of environmental mismanagement can generate hos-
tility across a range of actors from individuals to non-
governmental groups to nation-states and even to 
consortiums of nation-states.
Democracy, qua democracy, can itself be the source 
of alienation if it is permitted to devolve into majori-
tarian tyranny. Liberal democracy, with its respect for 
individual rights and the rule of law, has an architec-
ture that includes freedom of the press, an indepen-
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dent judiciary, and other attributes that help to avoid 
the kinds of pressures that can manifest themselves in 
violence when individuals and groups feel hopelessly 
subjugated by governments who simplistically cater 
to an undifferentiated version of “popular” will.
Yet it is nevertheless true that these concepts—free 
enterprise and liberal democracy—when tempered 
by the considerations just discussed, provide the best 
hope of reconciling mankind’s inherent impulse to act 
in its own best interests, with a parallel need to act col-
laboratively in a complex and interconnected world. 
Certainly these values have imperfect characteristics, 
but overall, they have proven superior to other con-
cepts of human organization.
AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY  
AND CONFLICT
Quite obviously, the values of an American grand 
strategy so defined thrive best in a conflict-free envi-
ronment. Historically—and, indeed, to this day—the 
primary purpose of the state is to create that environ-
ment. The means of doing so frequently was—and, it 
seems, still is—to organize the means of violence on be-
half of the state—or collection of states—and to apply 
it whenever the condition of peace was disturbed or 
threatened. In a perfect world, individuals and states 
inclined to disrupt peace would be deterred from do-
ing so by the prospect of conflict that, as a matter of 
logic, would be an inefficient and cost-prohibitive 
means of resolving disputes.
It is not, of course, a perfect world. Some individu-
als and states have perceived, and likely will continue 
to perceive, a security asymmetry that can be exploited 
to their benefit. What is more, for a variety of reasons—
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religion, ideology, cultural identity, and more—they 
can rationalize a sense of entitlement of superiority for 
themselves. Such perceptions can translate—however 
illogically—into a belief that those so disposed pos-
sess the power to achieve their ends by force. Efforts 
to dissuade such conclusions can be effective, but have 
their limits simply because intransigence can also be a 
feature of the human mind, and one that can contami-
nate the thinking of entire societies, to include those 
who are otherwise cosmopolitan and even generally 
pacific.
Plato reportedly adroitly observed that “only the 
dead have seen the end of war.” Thus, we must accept 
that the nature of the human condition is such that 
for the foreseeable future—irrespective of any grand 
strategy—the vagaries of the human condition—not to 
mention humanity’s aggressive impulses—will con-
tinue to challenge the success of an American grand 
strategy as I defined it. 
Yet the inevitability of human conflict does not 
mean we should abandon efforts to avoid it. Every 
instance of success represents lives saved and futures 
preserved. Even where violence cannot be avoided, 
efforts to ameliorate and limit its effects are patently 
worthy endeavors because they readily encourage a 
minimization of human suffering, as well as help cre-
ate a space, so to speak, for liberal democracy and free 
enterprise to take root and prosper.
The question then is how best to create those 
spaces in an era of the ever present risk of violence? In 
an interesting article in the March/April 2012 issue of 
Foreign Affairs entitled “A Clear and Present Safety,” 
the authors Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen as-
sert that America is safer and more secure than ever 
before, and faces no great power rival and no serious 
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threats.5 According to Zenko and Cohen, the United 
States needs a foreign policy that reflects that reality.
The article also contends that: 
because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats fac-
ing the United States, Washington overemphasizes 
military approaches to problems (including many that 
could best be solved by nonmilitary means).6 
It goes on to insist that:
although U.S. military strength has occasionally con-
tributed to creating a conducive environment for posi-
tive change, those improvements were achieved mostly 
through the work of civilian agencies and nongovern-
mental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors.7
Zenko and Cohen are not alone in their views. In 
his recent book, Winning the War on War, Joshua Gold-
stein made a similar claim, arguing that, “in fact, the 
world is becoming more peaceful.”8 Goldstein gives 
great credit not to the United States, but to the United 
Nations (UN) for its peacekeeping and other opera-
tions that he argues could be even more successful 
were they better funded and supported.
While there is much to commend about Zenko 
and Cohen’s essay (as well as the Goldstein book), the 
problem with the thesis that both propound is the in-
sufficient appreciation of what the world will be like 
if U.S. military power is perceived as compromised. 
If that were to become the case, there is the extraordi-
narily dangerous prospect that opportunistic nations 
will destabilize the world if they get the impression 
that U.S. military power is on the wane, let alone be-
ing deliberately diminished. Some around the globe 
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may cheer but, unfortunately, many are not necessar-
ily the friends of peace.
The real value of U.S. military power is that its mere 
existence in many instances permits—and gives gravi-
tas to—the very civilian/nongovernmental organiza-
tion (NGO) soft power concepts Zenko et al. endorse. 
To be sure, it is quite true that many successes in the 
past were the product of diplomatic, humanitarian, 
economic, and other distinctly nonmilitary efforts, but 
they were accomplished in a world where enormous 
American military power was always lurking in the 
background. The reality, as uncomfortable as it may 
be for many, is that the U.S. military is the irreplace-
able peace enabler in today’s world. 
There is little reason to assume that the same kind 
of soft-power victories that Zenko and others celebrate 
would be possible if the military equation is altered 
in a serious way. Should the overwhelming U.S. con-
ventional—and unconventional—capability recede, 
adversaries may see opportunity, perhaps not today, 
but in the foreseeable future. Once a capability is dis-
mantled—as has been done by the United States with 
the F-22 manufacturing line9—it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to resurrect it. We must never forget that 
U.S. military power takes the military option off the 
table for many competitors. Economic, social, politi-
cal, etc., competitions remain, but creating an environ-
ment where the military option becomes conceivable 
is hardly a desirable outcome.
To be clear, one might rightly agree that U.S. mili-
tary spending must come down to some degree in or-
der to help get our economic house in order, and that 
the nonmilitary elements of American power need to 
be better brought to bear in the execution of Ameri-
can grand strategy in the years to come. Yet, some still 
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believe that U.S. military might must remain the fun-
damental—if not central—element of American grand 
strategy for as long as we can imagine.
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT  
MANAGEMENT: THE LESSONS LEARNED
Of course, devising a fresh approach to peacebuild-
ing and conflict management requires an unvarnished 
examination of the operations of the past decade, and 
there are certainly many lessons to be learned from 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The effort to re-
orient entire societies in Iraq and Afghanistan via a 
strategy that was manpower-intensive and ground-
centric has proven to be flawed. 
Certainly, the American Soldier, given enough 
time and enough resources, can accomplish almost 
anything, to include the remaking of entire countries. 
The problem is that doing so first requires the applica-
tion of military force to the existing ruling cadre and 
its instruments of power so sternly and persistently as 
to imprint upon the society a sense of defeat so com-
plete that the environment is created where a com-
pletely new and—it is to be hoped—more peaceful 
and democratic society can emerge and the likelihood 
of resistance is markedly diminished.
Norman Friedman suggests this in his 2004 article 
Is Modern War Too Precise?10 In it, he indicates that for 
all its faults and shortcomings, the devastating World 
War II aerial bombardment of Germany may not have 
won many “hearts and minds” among the German 
people “but it did help preclude any post-surrender 
violence like what is now being seen in Iraq.”11 Regret-
tably, in Iraq, an ill-considered “race to Baghdad” in 
2003 stretched logistic lines and enabled Saddam’s Fe-
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dayeen to achieve some tactical success against sup-
port troops poorly prepared for infantry combat. This 
became something of a “proof of concept” for Iraqi 
insurgents that U.S. troops were, in fact, vulnerable.
It would have been far better to have exercised 
more patience and allowed American air and artil-
lery to progressively devastate Iraq’s elite military 
formations. Instead, they were allowed to melt away 
and form the core of the insurgency, which was never 
really crushed in nearly a decade of occupation. The 
Iraqi people—to include especially those who became 
the resistance—never internalized the shattering sense 
of defeat that enabled the Germans and Japanese at 
the end of World War II to abandon their deeply em-
bedded militaristic, racist, and totalitarian ideologies. 
Despite the experience with Japan and Germany, 
American leaders do not seem to fully comprehend 
what it takes to truly transform entire societies in a 
timeline shorter than several generations. Curiously, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 
Dempsey admitted that the aim of purging Afghani-
stan of the Taliban could have been achieved militar-
ily, since the United States: 
could have started at one end of Afghanistan and fun-
damentally overrun it, destroyed it, created a situa-
tion where we would make it a near certainty that the 
Taliban couldn’t come back, because there wouldn’t be 
anything to come back to. . . .12
General Dempsey hastened to add that such a 
forceful effort was “not who we are.”13 There are, of 
course, several observations to be made here, start-
ing with the idea that American values extant during 
World War II are not necessarily ones to be abandoned. 
More specifically, if the suggestion is that focusing 
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on the destruction of the enemy—the Taliban in this 
instance—invariably involves the wholesale oblitera-
tion of civilians and their property, he underestimates 
the revolutionary capabilities of a technological revo-
lution that allows force to be applied in a discrete 
way that is fully lawful and moral. That technologi-
cal revolution has, according to retired General Barry 
R. McCaffrey, “fundamentally changed the nature of 
warfare” by allowing the rise of persistent, long-term 
reconnaissance and precision strikes.14
It is becoming increasingly clear that force—par-
ticularly in counterinsurgency (COIN) situations—is 
the proven solution, especially when rapid results are 
needed. As Professor Anna Simons of the Naval Post-
graduate School contends:
Not only does COIN’s own history reflect the need 
for a stunning amount of brutality, but the fact that in 
campaign after campaign, commanders have found 
themselves desperate to be able to apply decisive force 
reveals what every generation ends up (re)discover-
ing the hard way: soft approaches don’t impel enough 
people to change their ways fast enough.15
Her conclusion fits with that of an ever-widening 
range of experts. Jill Hazelton of Harvard’s Belfer 
Center contends, contrary to popular wisdom, that 
[s]uccess in COIN does not require the protection of 
the populace, good governance, economic develop-
ment, or winning the allegiance or the loyalty of the 
great majority of the population.
Importantly, she says it “does not require build-
ing up all of the institutions of the state.”16 The grim 
realities of which she speaks should give pause to 
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COIN theorists who disparage the efficacy of force. 
In April 2011, the Washington Post reported that in 
Afghanistan, the: 
security improvements have been the result of intense 
fighting and the use of high-impact weapons systems 
not normally associated with the protect-the-population 
counterinsurgency mission.17
Nevertheless, because the U.S. military establish-
ment was dominated by ground-centric thinkers, the 
“solution” to the challenge of peacebuilding and con-
flict management necessarily had to involve ground 
forces, and lots of them. In the case of COIN, that so-
lution doctrinally eschewed force. Such was the na-
ture of Field Manual (FM) 3-24,18 published in 2006. It 
was, as one pundit put it, “warfare for northeastern 
graduate students” and other “people who would 
never own a gun.”19 Among other things, it called for 
enormous numbers of counterinsurgents (to comprise 
about 5 percent of the populations), with each Soldier 
prepared, as the FM said, to become “a social worker, a 
civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”20 
Nation building quite obviously was a critical element 
of the doctrine.
Executing the doctrine espoused in FM 3-24 justi-
fied huge increases in the size of American ground 
forces. Unfortunately, it ignored some key history 
about COIN operations and the presence of a large 
number of foreign troops. COIN expert William R. 
Polk insists that the “fundamental motivation” for 
insurgents is an “aim primarily to protect the integ-
rity of the native group from foreigners.”21 Likewise, 
in 2008, former Army Chief of Staff General John 
Wickham warned that “[l]arge military forces alien-
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ate local populations, succeed less and cost more.”22 
More recently, John Brennan, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 
pointed out: 
Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their 
cities and towns. In fact, large, intrusive military de-
ployments risk playing into al-Qa’ida’s strategy of 
trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us 
financially, inflame anti-American resentment and in-
spire the next generation of terrorists.23
THE FUTURE: “OFF SHORE”  
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
So what does all this mean for the future of peace-
building and conflict management, given the grand 
strategy I have outlined? At the outset, it is essential 
to understand that it does not mean that the United 
States should abandon peacebuilding and conflict 
management efforts. Nor does it mean that it is ut-
terly inconceivable that the United States might again 
conduct a large-footprint operation à la Iraq or Af-
ghanistan. What it does mean, however, is that large-
footprint operations for peacebuilding and conflict 
management missions need to undergo fundamental 
rethinking. 
Part of this requires the acceptance, however un-
wanted, of certain cold political realities, which in-
clude the fact that public support for the large-foot-
print war in Afghanistan is collapsing. Not only do 
78 percent of Americans favor withdrawing troops,24 
66 percent believe that the war has not been “worth 
fighting.”25 With respect to the latter, beyond the hu-
man cost, our present strategy is extremely costly. The 
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expense of deploying one American Soldier to Af-
ghanistan for 1 year has ballooned to $1.2 million,26 a 
figure to which planners must be especially sensitive 
now that the U.S. public is supporting substantial cuts 
in defense spending.27
While it does seem that it might be cheaper to 
deploy civilians to accomplish many of the nation-
building tasks currently performed by the military, 
the viability of that option is suspect.28 As a Congres-
sional Research Service report dated February 2, 2012, 
entitled Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Mis-
sions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress, re-
veals, the U.S. Government’s ability to conduct such 
missions remains deeply flawed, if not in disarray.29 
In any event, there is a tyranny of numbers involved, 
as even the most optimistic assessments do not con-
template many more than 2,000 experts would be 
involved, even if resources outside of government 
were tapped.30
Just as problematic is the sheer difficulty of peace-
building and conflict management in deeply flawed 
societies under circumstances where, as indicated 
above, the political decision has been made not to use 
force to the extent that has proven successful in past 
situations, even if it can be applied in a way that is 
fully lawful and moral. Still, in conflict management 
situations, force will necessarily have to be employed, 
but likely not via large numbers of American ground 
forces. The models for the future are more likely to be 
along the lines of the Kosovo intervention of the late 
1990s and Libya in 2011. As the New York Times put it:
Libya proved that the leaders of some medium-size 
powers can be overthrown from a distance, without 
putting American boots on the ground, by using weap-
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ons fired from sea and air with the heaviest load car-
ried by partner nations—in the case of Libya, European 
allies and even some Arab states. 31
In essence, this might be called “offshore conflict 
management.” This is not an especially new concept, 
and has been suggested for a number of scenarios of 
potential conflict. Retired Marine Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes has, for example, developed a proposal he 
calls “Offshore Control” aimed at leveraging U.S. tech-
nical advantages as a means of addressing the security 
challenge of China without necessarily putting a large 
mass of American troops on the Chinese mainland.32
In a sense, options for conflict management that 
avoid large troop deployments seem consonant with 
the Barack Obama administration’s emphasis on coun-
terterrorism operations aimed at key enemy leaders 
conducted by drones and special operations forces. 
In fact, the President recently explicitly stated that 
in Afghanistan, his “goal is not to build a country in 
America’s image” but rather “to destroy [al-Qaeda].”33 
To the extent this involves drone attacks against al-
Qaeda leadership, it has enormous support from 
the American people, with 83 percent approving of 
their use.34
Of course, not all conflict management can be 
accomplished by drones, or even special operation 
ground strikes like that which eliminated Osama bin 
Laden. That does require American ground forces, but 
with rare exceptions, the face of such operations ought 
to be indigenous personnel. In order to build the kind 
of capacity that host nations need, on-site trainers and 
mentors may be required, as is currently being done 
in Afghanistan. On-site mentorship does, however, 
carry an increased risk of a rogue killing a foreign 
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trainer. As of this writing, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) lost 19 soldiers to such attacks 
in 2012 alone.35 
A FRESH ENVIRONMENT
How, then, to do it? Perhaps what is needed is a 
massive program to take people out of their environ-
ment—to include even to the United States—so they 
can focus on the kind of transformative training, in-
deed, thinking that is essential to truly reforming and 
remaking the societies of failed or failing states. Doing 
so can also facilitate access to the necessary training 
personnel and resources. This would be as applicable 
for building expertise in the civilian sector—govern-
ment administrators as well as people from private 
enterprises—as it would be for the security services.
There is strong rationale for such an approach. 
Now retired Army Colonel-turned-university profes-
sor Peter Mansoor noted in a 2005 interview that train-
ing Iraqi forces outside of Iraq had its benefits:
The great advantage is the security is much better. You 
don’t have to guard the installation to the degree you 
have to in Iraq. . . . Another advantage is if it’s staffed 
by foreign officers, they don’t have to come into Iraq 
and become targets in order to teach. Also, existing 
facilities can be used that don’t require a lot of renova-
tion or rebuilding, as is the case with many buildings 
in Iraq.36
Obviously, a similar approach elsewhere would 
not eliminate the risks. But the chance of a rogue aris-
ing in such an environment can be minimized with 
careful vetting. The advantages are, in any event, 
manifold. For example, the difficulties of recruiting 
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and deploying skilled and experienced civilians to 
remote and dangerous locales would be markedly 
eased, especially if facilities could be located in the 
United States. Importantly, there are models already 
existing in the U.S. military of such programs working 
successfully. For example, the U.S. Air Force operates 
the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Lackland 
Air Force base in San Antonio, Texas, where techni-
cal courses are taught, “in Spanish and in English, to 
students from more than 22 countries every year.”37
To be successful, the scope of such schools and 
other educational facilities must be large and diverse. 
Even for a country the size of Afghanistan, this could 
involve tens of thousands of individuals each year. 
While certainly costly, it can hardly compare with 
the $1 million plus cost of sending a U.S. person to 
Afghanistan for a peacebuilding operation. Creating 
such a structure within the United States (or, perhaps, 
another country) may not be practical, but it may be 
possible to build a dedicated program within the ex-
isting American educational structure. For example, 
a program for advanced education might be con-
structed under the aegis of Kennesaw State’s Program 
in International Conflict Management, where interna-
tional students are given the opportunity to learn in 
the relative safety and security of an authentic Ameri-
can setting—and evaluate for themselves the potential 
application to their native country.
An important element of such an “off shore” ap-
proach would be the availability of training and edu-
cation in the native language of the students, while 
at the same time making English-language instruction 
available. Further, opportunities could be crafted for 
the students to learn about American culture and val-
ues. This is, emphatically, not intended to displace the 
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culture and values of the students’ home countries, but 
rather to help dispel the misperceptions of the United 
States that can arise in nations needing peacebuilding 
and conflict management.
This educational process can be supplemented by 
in-country and online programs (in the indigenous 
language) by means of equipment and facilities sup-
plied by the United States but manned by local nation-
als. Moreover, mentoring relationships can be built 
and maintained through daily interactions via Skype 
or similar technologies, to include social media for-
mats. Again, the physical presence of some U.S. per-
sonnel cannot (and, likely, should not) be eliminated, 
but the numbers could be reduced to the level that re-
alistically can be accommodated by programs such as 
the Civilian Response Corps.
CONCLUSION
The proposal this chapter advocates is certainly not 
a perfect one and will not satisfy every stakeholder. 
Unquestionably, for example, this kind of “off shore” 
proposal can be rightly criticized as a too lengthy, 
costly, and political capital-consuming methodology. 
Yet this back-to-basics approach may be the only way 
to realistically create the environment for genuine 
change, a process that can well take several genera-
tions. The “quick fixes” (e.g., build a school, equip a 
clinic, or grade a road) so attractive to the American 
mindset just do not work as effectively as one might 
hope.
Consider the work of researchers Daron Acemo-
glu and James A. Robinson. Although not focused 
on peacebuilding qua peacebuilding, their research 
leads them to the relevant observation that nations 
fail “when they have extractive economic institutions, 
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supported by extractive political institutions that im-
pede and even block economic growth.”38 This cannot 
be offset merely by digging wells, building clinics, or 
even economic development projects; it may necessi-
tate dramatic changes in attitudes among leadership 
and other elites. Indeed, without appropriate institu-
tional leaders, any physical assets provided become 
yet one more cause for conflict as corrupt power bro-
kers scramble for control of anything of value.
It is a mistake to underestimate the difficulty of 
rooting out venality writ large in less than a genera-
tion. This is one reason our efforts in Afghanistan 
remain stymied. As General David Petraeus said in 
2010, “there’s no question that corruption has been, 
for however long this country has probably been in 
existence, been part of the–literally the culture,”39 a 
point reiterated recently by former Secretary of De-
fense Leon Panetta.40 Indeed, “too much corruption,” 
along with “too many Afghan deserters” and “too few 
NATO trainers,” has been reported as a key obstacle 
to training Afghans to take over security duties once 
NATO departs.41
Even those disposed to be optimistic about the 
outcome in Afghanistan have no illusions about the 
depth of this societal flaw and what it will take to over-
come it. Major General H. R. McMaster, who led a task 
force to root out corruption, was recently reported as 
saying that:
[T]he root of Afghanistan’s corruption problem goes 
deeper, to three decades of ‘trauma that it’s been 
through, the legacy of the 1990s civil war . . . [and] 
the effects of the narcotics trade.’ Add to that the un-
intended consequences of sudden Western attention 
starting in 2001: ‘We did exacerbate the problem with 
lack of transparency and accountability built into the 
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large influx of international assistance that came into a 
government that lacked mature institutions.’42
While it may not necessarily take decades to excise 
the corruption endemic to Afghan society, it is clearly 
a long-term task. Selected uses of force employing off-
shore and light-footprint capabilities for conflict man-
agement can help buy time for nonmilitary processes 
to work if, and only if, a major effort is made to grow 
the next generation of political, military, and eco-
nomic leaders with a sophisticated understanding of 
the damaging effects of corruption on Afghanistan’s 
future. Much the same can be said for other—and fu-
ture—“Afghanistans” around the globe.
There are many unique factors about Afghanistan 
that make it an imperfect example of the kind of peace-
building and conflict management issues that will 
arise in the coming years as the United States grap-
ples with building an approach that meets the needs 
of U.S. grand strategy, yet is one that is sound in the 
political reality of an austere funding environment. To 
be politically viable, we must develop options that are 
less demanding in blood and money. 
Off-shore peacebuilding and conflict manage-
ment will not work in every instance, but the basics 
of it—that is, the idea of a light footprint approach 
that leverages America’s asymmetric advantages in 
high technology43—might perhaps be a useful starting 
point when the next such challenge arises, as it inevi-
tably will. At the end of the day, the approach must be 
grounded in the idea that notwithstanding whatever 
assistance any outside entity can provide, the ultimate 
responsibility is upon the people themselves, and de-
veloping their capabilities (as opposed to ours, per se) 
is the central task of peacebuilding and conflict man-
agement as we look ahead.
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